The Iraq Study Group (ISG), also known as the Baker-Hamilton Commission, issued its report two weeks ago. The President’s neoconservative policy leaders have incrementally rejected the report’s conclusions, some for ideological reasons, others on more practical grounds. These leaders include people in powerful positions, such as Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice. It appears unlikely that the report’s conclusions will be adopted.
Although its suggestions may not be implemented, the ISG report has achieved one significant accomplishment. It serves as a factual resource from which policy debates can occur. For the first time in three and a half years, Americans are united in their understanding of what’s going on in Iraq. Smokescreens issued by ideologues on all sides have drifted away and dissipated. Claims that the media under-reported “the good things” in Iraq, or acquiesced by not showing the dead and injured American soldiers returning home, or supported vacuous rhetoric such as “the insurgency is in its last throes” are all debunked. Even the president has finally acknowledged that his project in Iraq is not going well, and that America is losing.
The result is a palpable change in kitchen table discussions across America—at least in homes where such conversation is still allowed. On the topic of Iraq, the facts can no longer be dismissed. There is a consensus that the situation is bad and we are losing the war. The nature of our discussion has changed: we used to argue over facts and the assessment of facts—Is there a problem?, Are we winning or losing?, Is it bad or good? Those discussions have disappeared. Now we focus on how to solve the very real problem in Iraq. With the end of the rhetorical debate, citizens can no longer demonize each other for being stupid or uninformed. The ISG report pushed America beyond its self-imposed blindness and significantly altered this debate. This change is the report’s greatest and very valuable contribution.
The ISG report has also quieted the debate about why we invaded Iraq in the first place. In the environment of rhetorical demonization or opponents, the proclaimed purpose of the war was paramount. To critics, it was obvious that the purpose was lust for oil, a family feud with Saddam Hussein, or stupidity on the part of our leadership. To war supporters, it was equally obvious that Saddam Hussein was a real threat, it is better to fight terrorists over there, and nuclear annihilation was close at hand—hence, the war was worth the sacrifice. A person who disagreed with one position or the other was automatically demonized by his opponents as being foolish, uninformed, treasonous, or a mere lackey of one style of rhetoric or the other. If there were problems in Iraq, it was clearly the fault of those on the other side.
At least for the moment, the ISG report has changed all that. For a short time, probably only until the President issues his decision on what to do in Iraq, America has suspended judgment and faced the hard, cold facts of reality. We are losing in Iraq. We realize there are few good options. All across America, people are thinking about what to do. What is the best approach? It is a unique relief in the national rhetoric to have the citizenry focused on a solution, rather than on blame. Credit the ISG report with that much—it moved us beyond the propaganda, deception, and mistruths on all sides. It enabled us to see what has been wrought in our name. Now, we can judge it, and we can try to solve it. I welcome that change.
Anthony Signorelli is the author of Call to Liberty: Bridging the Divide Between Liberals and Conservatives
